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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM:1 THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The Human Genome Project (HGP) may well be the beginning of a
technological leap that rivals the advent of the Industrial Age.2 The
principal goal of the project is to map and fully sequence3 the twentyfour chromosomes that contain the complete genetic contents of a
normal human cell. The human genome consists of twenty-two pairs of
chromosomes plus the X and Y chromosomes that determine gender.4 As
would be expected for such a technologically adventurous undertaking,
the HGP has been accompanied by a substantial outpouring of concern
about the ethical, legal, and social issues that will arise from this vast
new knowledge and anticipated power. These concerns were of such a
magnitude that the federal agencies funding the HGP set aside up
to five percent of their total budgets to fund projects that would examine
1. The word “problem” is used here in the sense of a difficult decision as to what
choice to make in a particular situation or group of related situations. It is often the role
of law to prescribe what choices are permissible in particular circumstances. Lawyers,
or more precisely lawmakers, must bring to bear a variety of tools to formulate a good or
just law prescribing the permissible courses of future conduct. See generally Nola
Nouryan & Martha S. Weisel, Essays on Creative Problem Solving: Psychologists,
Attorneys and Disclosure, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 125 (1999) (analyzing the conflict
between legal ethics and psychologists’ ethics concerning the disclosure in litigation of
psychological test data). The purpose of this Essay is to demonstrate the value of a
particular approach to an emerging problem of considerable significance. I argue that
the social philosophy of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999), provides an adequate basis for the resolution of the good or just
solution to the problem of whether employers may be allowed to use genetic testing to
discriminate against individuals who are hypersensitive to workplace toxins.
2. Larry B. Stammer, Physicist Awarded $948,000 Templeton Prize, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2000, at A23 (“Biotechnology, including breakthroughs in the application of
discoveries in human genetics, will pose the biggest impact on human development in
the next 100 years.” (quoting Freeman J. Dyson)).
3. Mapping a chromosome means to determine, first, the location of thousands of
identifiable areas of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and ultimately the location of genes
on the chromosome. National Human Genome Research Institute, From Maps to
Medicine: About the Human Genome Research Project, at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/
Policy_and_public_affairs/Communications/Publications/Maps_to_medicine/about.html
(last visited June 18, 2002). Sequencing a chromosome, or its constituent part, a gene,
means to determine the order of its nucleotide bases adenine (A), thymidine (T), guanine
(G), and cytosine (C), which comprise the building blocks of DNA and encode the
genetic instructions of all living things. Id. Some viruses, however, use ribonucleic acid
(RNA) only, which relies on similar principles, except RNA contains uracil (U) rather
than thymidine. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA 36, 225 (2d ed. 1992).
For an excellent introduction to the general science of genetics and molecular biology,
see generally id.
4. For additional details concerning the HGP, visit the Web site of the National
Human Genome Research Institute, National Human Genome Research Institute, at
http://www.genome.gov (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
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the “[e]thical, [l]egal and [s]ocial [i]mplications” of the HGP.5
The ethical, legal, and social problems that surround the potential
ramifications of the HGP can be divided into two basic groups:
knowledge and power. By this bifurcation I mean that many of the
problems involve issues that are raised by the simple availability of a
great deal of new knowledge about the genotype6 of people, regardless
of whether or not that information is accompanied by any significant
new power to affect the possible outcomes of particular genotypes.
Other problems, however, would emerge from the availability of any
significant new power to alter genotypes or the outcome of particular
genotypes. To further illustrate this dichotomy, let us consider the
possibility of new genetic information concerning an individual’s
probable increased risk of dying of some very deadly form of cancer,
such as neuroblastoma glioma. There are ethical, legal, and social
problems concerning the use of such knowledge. These problems arise
regardless of whether or not there is anything more that a high-risk
individual can do beyond current measures, such as monitoring, surgery,
and chemotherapy, which are currently largely ineffective to reduce the
risk significantly. However, if gene therapy for the particular high risk
of neuroblastoma genotype becomes possible, then different issues
concerning access and use of that power arise. In both the informational
and power categories even more difficult problems arise concerning
other possible genotypic information beyond disease susceptibility, such
as genotypic information about factors related to intelligence or skills,
such as mathematical or musical ability.
The information problems need to be solved before the power
questions need to be answered because genotypic information is
accumulating rapidly,7 while the power to affect significantly the
5. See National Human Genome Research Institute, What Is ELSI?, at
http://www. nhgri.nih.gov/ELSI/aboutels.html (last updated Mar. 2000); see also Ethical,
Legal, and Social Issues Research, at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/research/elsi.html (last
modified May 15, 2002).
6. Genotype refers to the “complete genetic composition of an organism, while its
phenotype is the physical expression of that genotype.” WATSON ET AL., supra note 3, at
7. For example, a person with a particular genotype may be identifiable at the
phenotypic level by blue eyes, or by extreme height, while other genotypic variations
cannot be easily detected at the phenotypic level.
7. Robert Pear, Rules on Privacy of Patient Data Stir Hot Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1999, at A1 (“Scientists have developed more than 450 genetic tests that may
help identify people with an increased risk of developing breast cancer, prostate cancer,
cystic fibrosis and other diseases.”).
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genotype is moving slowly.8 As a result of the rapid growth of
information about the relationships between a large number of genes and
potential disease,9 a great deal of public attention has already been given
to the question of how access to such information should be controlled
and the circumstances under which such genetic testing could be
required by third parties, such as employers or insurers. Because these
informational issues have received a great deal of attention, a
widespread consensus now supports protecting the absolute right of
persons to control the information provided by any genetic testing they
might choose to undergo and also prohibiting the use by employers of
any genetic tests or genetic information concerning their employees.10
That consensus is reflected in an Executive order signed by President
8.

Nicholas Wade, writing for the New York Times, stated:
Gene therapy, a technique long on promise and so far very short on
fulfillment, may be achieving a glimmering of success in a treatment for
hemophilia B, a disease in which the blood does not clot properly.
The idea of gene therapy is to treat diseases that are the result of a
defective gene by inserting the correct form of the gene into a patient’s cells.
If the technique worked, it could be a powerful remedy for many diseases that
are hard to treat. But despite 20 years of effort and some 200 current trials, the
Food and Drug Administration has yet to approve any form of gene therapy.
Nicholas Wade, Hint of Success Seen for Gene Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2000, at A20.
9. Pear, supra note 7, at A1.
10. See, e.g., Wendy R. Uhlmann, When Genes Are Decoded, Who Should See the
Results?: ‘Every One of Us Is at Risk’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at F7 (praising
President Clinton’s Executive order banning federal agencies from using genetic
information in decisions to hire, promote, or dismiss employees); see also Mark A.
Rothstein, Genetics and the Workforce of the Next Hundred Years, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 371, 392–95 (2000) (stating that the issue is part of a broad conflict between
paternalistic and autonomy driven strands of employment law, and suggesting that the
proper resolution is in favor of autonomy and worker choice as to whether or not to be
tested and whether or not to accept the risks of employment). But see Richard A.
Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New
Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, (1994) (arguing vigorously that a free market approach
to genetic testing based on libertarian and economic efficiency rationales is appropriate);
Mark A. Hall, When Genes Are Decoded, Who Should See the Results?: Many ‘Greatly
Overestimate the Risk’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at F7 (asserting that companies are
unlikely to use genetic tests even if they are permitted to do so). Interestingly, Professor
Epstein does briefly refer to John Rawls, using Rawls as representative of the modern
view that inequalities due to luck should be offset by social action:
The position of John Rawls that certain attributes are morally arbitrary surely
carries over to the situation of genetic differences. Many people do not believe
that individuals own their talents and abilities. Still more people believe that
they should not be burdened with bad luck in the genetic draw. When
differences in luck are attributable solely to external circumstances, this
modern view holds that something ought to be done to rectify the situation.
That is, we must equalize the positions of various individuals or groups, even
if it means (as it always does) that property, wealth, and opportunities must be
taken from one group of people and given to another.
Epstein, supra, at 4 & n.15 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 506–12
(1971)).
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Clinton that prohibits discrimination in federal employment based on
genetic information and prevents federal employers from requesting,
requiring, or collecting genetic information about federal employees.11
The purpose of this Essay is to build a case for the viewpoint that,
with appropriate limits and safeguards, it is appropriate to exclude
individuals from some employment opportunities if they are known to
have genetic factors that predispose them to diseases that would render
them abnormally sensitive to the dangers of that workplace.12
I defend the use of genetic information in decisionmaking about
exposure to workplace toxins on the basis of fairness, particularly as that
concept has been developed in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.13 I do
so in part to demonstrate that the solution of difficult social problems14
requires the use of a coherent jurisprudential or philosophical framework.
In reflecting on the particular problem of genetic discrimination, it
appears that the problem is one that is best resolved by recourse to the
philosophical framework of John Rawls. A Rawlsian approach to the
problem is the most useful both because of the inherent power and value
of Rawls’s philosophy and because his device of the “veil of
ignorance”15 parallels our current social circumstance of being on the
11. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000). The principal exception to the
absolute ban on genetic testing is to allow for such testing to be used to determine
whether or not an employee had suffered genetic damage as a result of exposure to
workplace radiation or toxic substances. Id. The consensus against genetic discrimination
may also be seen in the growing number of state statutes that also prohibit the use of
genetic information. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(11) (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19302 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.39 (West 1997 & Supp.
2001).
12. A rather similar argument to that made here could also be used to argue for the
exclusion of some persons from some occupations on the basis of a genetic
predisposition to disease which would render them abnormally dangerous to others were
they to be given particular employment responsibilities. For instance, an abnormally
high risk of sudden death or seizure might disqualify one from serving as an airline pilot.
Although that argument is not made here, it would follow much the same logic. What is
not intended to be implied here is the extent to which fairness or justice requires that the
norms for other contexts that cannot be easily avoided, such as general air pollution,
must be adjusted to protect the genetically least advantaged. I hope to explore that issue
in a subsequent article.
13. RAWLS, supra note 1.
14. That is, the delimitation of appropriate choices in circumstances that present
difficulties and trade-offs. For further commentary on making appropriate choices under
such circumstances, see Nouryan & Weisel, supra note 1, and RAWLS, supra note 1. In
the present case, competing values of privacy, efficiency, and autonomy are at issue in
the use of genetic information in the workplace.
15. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11.
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cusp of the era of vast amounts of new genetic information. In an
important sense, we stand behind a veil of genetic ignorance, attempting
to decide the rules that should govern us after that veil is soon lifted. In
brief, the notion developed here is that genetic disadvantage, at least
insofar as it refers to latent hypersusceptibility to the ill effects of
workplace toxins, is very much the kind of difference between
individuals that, under a Rawlsian analysis of justice and fairness, should
be subject to an arrangement that would increase aggregate social wellbeing by excluding the genetically most susceptible while compensating
them for their lost opportunities.16
Part II of this Essay provides a very brief introduction to the Rawlsian
concept of justice upon which this argument is based. Part II
distinguishes this Rawlsian argument from any attempt to ground an
argument for genetic discrimination in existing law, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).17 In Part III, I use Rawls’s
framework to analyze a hypothetical scenario in which a newly
developed genetic test would permit the identification of a subpopulation
of individuals who are at a much higher risk of developing cancer in a
particular industrial workplace. The analysis in Part III leads to the
conclusion that the correct choice in that scenario is a system in which
employers can test and exclude by contributing to a compensation fund
that would benefit those excluded, which I will refer to as pay-toexclude. Finally, Part IV attempts to describe briefly the basic outlines
16. It is important to note that I use the word “opportunity” here in its ordinary
economic sense, rather than in the context of Rawls’s carefully defined “fair equality of
opportunity,” as part of the two principles of justice. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 53.
What must also be clearly understood is that the rights to particular jobs are not basic
liberties as Rawls defined them, and that Rawls explicitly allowed inequalities in wealth
(and presumably access to particular jobs) so long as the inequality “is to everyone’s
advantage.” Id. at 54. In this sense, equality of opportunity no more requires that a
hypersensitive person be entitled to a job that puts her at extraordinary risk than I have
the right to start as a linebacker for the San Diego Chargers, engendering even greater
risks to my well-being. We are both genetically unsuited for positions we might
otherwise desire. However, I would argue that my lack of talent, which at least thirty
years ago was in no small measure due to my genes for size and fast-twitch muscle fiber,
requires no compensation for my limitation, whereas I believe genetic susceptibility to a
workplace toxin is the sort of disadvantage that requires special concern from a Rawlsian
perspective. The distinction between these two types of genetic disadvantage derives
from the difference between the existence of unique positions to which only a fortunate
few are suitably talented and the existence of more common positions from which only
an unfortunate few are excluded. If particular positions, such as a member of a
professional football team or a position as a chaired professor of physics at California
Institute of Technology, require unusual talent, our sense of fairness is not aroused by the
fact that the great majority of people do not have the ability required. Rawls is more
concerned with the plight of the least advantaged. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 136
(explaining that within his system of justice “we are to maximize (subject to the usual
constraints) the prospects of the least advantaged”).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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of the pay-to-exclude system and demonstrate the way in which it
addresses some of the foreseeable issues and objections to such a
system.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice18 is widely considered to be one of
the most important contributions to the literature of law and philosophy
written in the twentieth century.19 Rawls’s stated objective in A Theory
of Justice was to explore the meaning of justice from within the
contractarian tradition of Locke and Rousseau and with an essentially
Kantian orientation towards the primacy of individual rights over
utilitarian-derived norms. To anchor his contractarian exploration of
justice, Rawls used the device of the original position, which he likened
to the state of nature conceptions of his philosophical forebears.
However, Rawls added to the original position the constraints of the veil
of ignorance.
A brief exposition of these related concepts should suffice for
purposes of this Essay. First, Rawls assumed that a society and the
social institutions which comprise it would be fair or just if the rules
governing that society were those that would be freely chosen by
persons entering into the society as autonomous, self-interested
individuals with equal rights to determine the rules. This presocietal
negotiation is the original position.20 Second, Rawls assumed that in
order to insure the true fairness of the rules that would be selected, the
parties in the original position must bargain without knowledge of the
strengths, talents, weaknesses, and disabilities they would actually
possess once they left the original position and entered into the society
whose rules they had chosen. This absence of individual knowledge is
the veil of ignorance.21 Thus, the individuals are self-interested in a very
particular way; they would bargain for rules that would benefit
themselves regardless of their actual lot in life. Thus an individual
18. RAWLS, supra note 1.
19. A rough measure of its impact can certainly be seen in the frequency with
which it is cited. First published in 1971, a search of the law review database in LEXIS
revealed close to 500 articles citing A Theory of Justice in the two-year period ending
April 25, 2000.
20. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11.
21. Id.
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considering the possibility that she might be gifted with intelligence,
leadership, and health would bargain for rules governing society that
would reward persons so blessed. However, at the same time, mindful
of the possibility that she might be of below average intelligence,
socially inept, and afflicted by significant physical disability, she would
also bargain for rules that minimized the impact of those shortcomings
on her welfare to the greatest possible extent. The fundamental principle
that accommodates both the reward for talents and the minimization of
disadvantage is Rawls’s “difference principle.”22 The difference principle
requires that the more talented are rewarded only to the extent necessary to
induce them to exercise their talents fully, in order to create an overall
structure that works to minimize the disadvantage and maximize the
welfare of the least-well-off or most disadvantaged members of
society.23
The present problem is one that is remarkably amenable to examination
through a Rawlsian lens. The conceptual starting point of Rawls’s A
Theory of Justice, the original position accompanied by the veil of
ignorance, has been criticized as resting on a very artificial and
unworkable device.24 That criticism might be least well-founded in the
present context. With most of the information from the HGP still to be
deciphered, we are, perhaps, as close to being in the original position
and truly behind the veil as we can ever be. We are already beginning to
discover numerous genetic variations that are associated with increased
risks of cancer. We will undoubtedly be discovering many more in the
next decade. Furthermore, we will begin to understand a great deal more
about the nature of the risk posed by particular variations, both with
respect to the absolute magnitude of such risks and also as to particular
environmental events that interact with particular variant genes and gene
products to increase the risks of those variant genes.25 We can set the
22. Id. at 65–68.
23. Id. at 68.
24. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1997) (criticizing the circular nature of Rawls’s “mythic” person behind
the veil). “The ‘real’ consumer of liberal justification is already deeply ensconced in the
circles of liberal justification, for he is himself already a mythified construction.” Id.
25. In presenting the main thesis of this Essay at a symposium attended by Dr.
Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, the
question of the hypersensitivity gene assumption was the subject of considerable
discussion with Dr. Collins, both during the symposium and during a private discussion
during lunch. Symposium, Genes and the Just Society, University of San Diego School
of Law (Jan. 29, 2000). Dr. Collins’s believed the current data showed environmental
carcinogenicity to be largely “stochastic,” that is, a matter of random probability.
Such a stochastic model would arise so long as most environmental carcinogens are
DNA damaging in a nonselective manner, that is, they damage DNA but do so without
preference for interacting with or damaging any particular stretch of DNA. These

754

FINALBOHRER.DOC

[VOL. 39: 747, 2002]

2/11/2020 1:59 PM

A Rawlsian Approach
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

rules for the postgenome society while still behind the veil, largely
ignorant of our actual lot in the postgenomic order.
It is important to note that this argument is not an attempt to determine
the application or significance of existing laws for the problem of
employer testing for employee susceptibility to workplace toxins,
interesting though that exercise might be. For example, whether the
ADA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of genetic
information is currently an unanswered question.26 Although the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has taken the position

nonselective DNA damaging molecules will generally not cause any damage at all,
because they will likely damage the non coding majority of DNA in a cell or do minimal
damage, because they are damaging the DNA of a nondividing cell or only one copy of a
gene where the remaining copy is sufficient. Thus, for such nonselective agents, the low
incidence of cancers produced relates not to individual differences in sensitivity, but to
mere chance, given a low probability event in any one exposed individual. Dr. Collins’s
point, however correct it may be for the large percentage of cases, does not address the
issue of what to do in those cases where selective carcinogens can be identified.
Further research on the carcinogen used as an example in this Essay reveals that there
is a growing body of evidence that supports the proposition that there are, in fact,
particular genotypes that result in significantly elevated risk from exposure to benzene.
See Richard A. Larson et al., Prevalence of the Inactivating 609CT Polymorphism in
the NAD(P)H:Quinone Oxidoreductase (NQO1) Gene in Patients with Primary and
Therapy-Related Myeloid Leukemia, 94 BLOOD: J. AM. SOC’Y HEMATOLOGY 803, 806
(1999) (concluding that persons with a particular NQO1 genotype may be particularly
vulnerable to the leukemogenic effects of particular carcinogens); Martyn T. Smith,
Benzene, NQO1, and Genetic Susceptibility to Cancer, 96 PNAS 7624,7624–25 (1999)
(explaining benzene’s carcinogenic effect on DNA and its role in genetic susceptibility
to cancer).
26. Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination
in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 239 (2000). Mr. Miller, who was
Commissioner of the EEOC, stated that:
[C]ourts have still not determined whether the ADA should be understood to
restrict discrimination on the basis of a diagnosed, but asymptomatic, genetic
condition or trait.
In 1995, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
adopted policy guidance stating that the ADA prohibits discrimination against
workers based on their genetic makeup. This policy guidance explicitly states
that the third part of the definition of disability, the “regarded as” prong,
covers individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of a genetic
predisposition to illness, disease, or other disorder, even if the disability has
not yet manifested.
Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Miller and the EEOC were referring to genetic predispositions
that are not necessarily altered by the particular workplace environment. The question of
whether the ADA covers workplace discrimination on the basis of genetic
predispositions that are adversely affected by the particular workplace environment is a
different issue. See discussion infra note 28.
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that genetic discrimination is a violation of the ADA.27 It has also issued
a regulation that allows employers to discriminate against individuals
whose employment would pose a direct threat to their own health.28
However, the question dealt with in this Essay is whether an ideal
Rawlsian law would permit employer discrimination against
hypersusceptible individuals, not whether such discrimination is
permitted under current law.
III. A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO FOR GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
Genetic variations will likely be found that increase the risks, in
particular environments, of a variety of different disease types, including
cardiovascular disease and central nervous system diseases such as
Parkinson’s disease and Multiple Sclerosis. However, for purposes of
simplifying the discussion, I will address only the hypothetical risk of a
particularly intractable and fatal form of brain cancer, glioblastoma. I
also assume for this discussion that in the future a particular genetic
variation will be found to be associated with a greatly increased risk of
that disease particularly after exposure to even very small amounts of a
particular workplace toxin, such as benzene.29
27. Miller, supra note 26, at 239.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001). In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, No. 001406, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4202, at *1 (June 10, 2002) the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the EEOC’s position that the ADA permitted employers to discriminate against at
risk employees in order to avoid a direct threat to the individual’s health. Chevron had
refused to hire an applicant with liver damage due to Hepatitis C for a position in a
refinery, where he would be exposed to chemical levels that Chevron’s doctors asserted
would aggravate his liver disease. Id. at *7. The Chevron Court’s ruling that employers
could discriminate against employees to protect them from direct threats to their own
health was not made in the context of a threat that was identified on the basis of genetic
testing. However, it could be argued as generally supportive of the position here. It
would be hard to identify an ethical principle that would justify discrimination to protect
workers or job applicants against all risks to health other than those that arose from their
genetic susceptibility. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron resolved the prior
conflict between the circuit courts on the issue of discrimination against at risk
employees. Compare Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 213 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir.
2000) (ruling in favor of job applicant Echazabal and against the EEOC’s position), with
Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F3d. 446, 447–48 (11th Cir. 1996) (permitting
discrimination against an epileptic worker whose contact with dangerous machinery
would have posed a direct risk to his own health).
29. I have chosen benzene as the toxic substance for this discussion because the
regulatory history of OSHA’s attempt to set stringent standards for workplace exposures
to benzene provides a rather rich factual context for discussions of workplace toxic
exposures. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 652–53 (1980)
(holding that just because benzene is a carcinogen, OSHA may not presume that the
prior standard posed an unreasonable risk to worker health and set the acceptable
exposure level at the lowest level feasible); see also Larson et al., supra note 25, at 806
(concluding that persons with a particular NQO1 genotype may be particularly
vulnerable to the leukemogenic effects of particular carcinogens); Smith, supra note 25,
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Benzene is a known carcinogen, or cancer-causing substance.
Benzene-induced cancers can result from exposure to air containing low
concentrations of benzene. In the protracted litigation over the attempt
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to set
very stringent standards for exposure to benzene in workplace air, the
focus was primarily on benzene’s known linkage to leukemia. Although
we are assuming a future discovery of a linkage between benzene
exposure and the risk of glioblastoma for persons with a particular
genotype,30 a bit of discussion about the known risks of benzene would
be helpful. The industry affected by OSHA’s proposed benzene
standard disagreed with OSHA’s risk assessment that benzene was
carcinogenic at the then-prevailing standard of ten parts per million
(p.p.m.). For our purposes it is important to understand that, even if
OSHA was correct in assuming that the risk was several times greater
than normal at ten p.p.m., the risk may not have been evenly distributed
across the exposed population. We know that individual susceptibilities
to toxic exposures can vary,31 in the same way that some people can
smoke for many years without developing lung cancer while others will
develop lung cancer after having smoked cigarettes for a much shorter
period of time. What we do not yet know, but are likely soon to begin
understanding, is the biochemical and genetic basis for some of the
variation in such susceptibilities. It may indeed prove to be the case for
benzene that a risk of, for example, fifty additional cases of cancer per
million exposed persons is not a fifty per million risk that is borne by
each of any million exposed persons. Rather than being equally
distributed, it may be a much less than one in a million risk for 990,000
of those million exposed persons and a far higher risk for the remaining
one percent or less of the exposed population. That is to say, virtually
all of the additional cases of cancer from exposure to low levels of
benzene or some other carcinogen may arise in a relatively small
subgroup that is genotypically distinct and at a relatively high risk of
exposures that are likely to present a trivial risk to persons with more
common genotypes.32

at 7624–25 (discussing NQO1’s hypothesized ability to protect against benzene toxicity
and benzene induced leukemia).
30. Smith, supra note 25, at 7624–25.
31. Larson et al., supra note 25, at 803.
32. Id.
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With that as a prologue, we convene our discussion from behind the
veil of genotypic ignorance of how best to deal with our soon to be laid
bare susceptibility to benzene. Let us assume that none of us know our
genotype in that regard and that a particular genotype has been
discovered to create a one percent risk of glioblastoma, even at the
prevailing OSHA workplace standard of one p.p.m.33 Furthermore, we
may assume that the risk has never been detected epidemiologically
because the particular genotypic variant is believed to be extremely
uncommon, for example, occurring only in one of every 1000 people.
Thus, a million people exposed at those levels, which is probably three
times the actual benzene-exposed workforce, would include one
thousand susceptible individuals and would generate an additional ten
cases of glioblastoma. Because the actual exposed workforce is about
one third of that, the additional three cases of glioblastoma that would
actually occur in the approximately 330 genotypically sensitive persons
in an exposed population of 350,000 would be virtually impossible to
detect epidemiologically. Let us also assume that the other 349,670
genotypically more fortunate persons in the exposed population would
be at no measurable increased risk of glioblastoma, even after a lifetime
of exposure at one p.p.m.
A one percent risk of glioblastoma is a very serious risk indeed. It is a
risk of a particularly virulent and implacable cancer that, over the course
of twelve months, inflicts increasingly terrible suffering and pain on its
victims before they die. It is a fate that no rational person would choose,
and a one percent risk of such a fate, if it easily could be avoided, would
almost certainly be avoided by any rational person. Of course, the key
word is easily. A rational person might accept a one percent risk of
glioblastoma if virtually all gainful employment carried with it such a
risk and if the alternative to the one percent risk of glioblastoma was a
far greater risk of being totally without the means of basic support, with
concomitant misery, suffering, and starvation for one’s self and one’s
family. However, it is precisely to bargain over the ramifications of
newly discovered genetic susceptibilities such as this that we must
retreat behind the veil of ignorance.34

33. Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028(c) (2001).
34. In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, the authors noted the
troubling possibility that upon lifting the veil the genetically advantaged will “form their
own risk pools, making their industries more efficient at the expense of justice.” ALLEN
BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 58 (2000). This
Essay argues that this undesirable outcome of genetic knowledge would be avoided
under this proposal and that the ex-ante commitment to the genetically disadvantaged
embodies the principles of justice to which the authors required commitment. Id. at 58–59.
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So, we know nothing of our actual genotype for this particular
purpose.35 We do know that in the real world some greatly heightened
susceptibilities to some workplace toxins are likely to be discovered.
Our scenario is also one in which the greatly heightened susceptibility
affects a relatively small percentage of the overall population that is
thereby at a much greater risk of a serious disease. Assuming a normal
distribution of sensitivities, those persons who are several standard
deviations above the mean, in terms of increased risk at a given exposure
level, will be a very small percentage of the overall population. Our
scenario is based on the assumption that some such highly skewed risk
distributions will ultimately be identified and attributed to particular
genetic variations. We can also assume, in crafting our bargain, that for
benzene, as for many such toxins, it would impose enormous
incremental costs to lower the exposure levels to a level safe for this
subset of most sensitive individuals, rather than maintaining a level that
is merely safe for persons within the ordinary range of sensitivity.36
What are our possible choices? First, we could insist that all workplace
environments spend whatever is necessary to make their environments
reasonably safe for the individuals who are most genetically susceptible
to that environment or, if unwilling or unable to do so, shut down.37 I
35. Of course, someone with a close relative who has died of glioblastoma or some
other family history of cancer might suspect something about their genotype, but for
purposes of this discussion I will assume that such suspicions do not affect the
bargaining.
36. If there are cases in which there is minimal additional expense necessary to
clean up the environment to the level safe for the most sensitive, we might well want to
treat those cases as different in kind and subject to different rules from those cases in
which the expense is great and the numbers affected few. For purposes of this Essay, I
limit my argument to the cases in which the savings in cleanup costs is clearly enough to
allow the employer to pay the required fee into the central compensation fund. In fact,
any substantial compensation requirement acts as its own self-regulating mechanism on
employer behavior—an employer who chooses to test and discriminate would do so only
when the savings warrant such a course. See infra Part IV.
37. This is substantially the position taken by Elaine Draper in her article, The
Screening of America: The Social and Legal Framework of Employers’ Use of Genetic
Information:
If risk is conceptualized in terms of the personal habits or biology of
individuals, it naturally appears beneficial to develop screening programs to
identify people who take drugs or have genetic characteristics that may present
a health hazard on the job. But if employers want to provide a safe workplace,
they should tighten engineering controls, monitor exposure hazards, replace
hazardous products, and collect scientific information on risks to populations;
only such efforts can reveal whether working conditions are indeed safe.
Priorities in health policy should be redirected toward reducing risk without
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think that the Rawlsian bargainers would not require such an absolutist
approach because of its obvious impact on the overall welfare of the
group.38
Second, we could simply require that workplace environments be
made reasonably safe for persons of ordinary sensitivity and prohibit
those workplaces from using tests of genetic sensitivity to exclude those
persons who would face a significant risk of glioblastoma at the levels
that are reasonably safe for persons of ordinary sensitivity. Under this
alternative, we would only prohibit employers from gaining and using
such knowledge; workers or applicants for employment would be free to
self-test and to make their own decisions as to whether to accept the
risks associated with employment. The potential employees would then
divide up into at least three groups, the risk ostriches who simply do not
want to know of their susceptibility, the risk averse who test and selfexclude if at risk, and the risk takers who test and ignore the risk.
The question of whether risk ostriches and risk-prone individuals that
take jobs despite knowing or avoiding knowledge of their genetic
susceptibility should be allowed to recover in tort or workers’
compensation for their resulting injuries is beyond the scope of this
Essay. However, the question of whether persons who are behind the
veil would bargain for a freedom of choice for risk ostriches and risktaking individuals is a very interesting question that comes close to the
heart of Rawls’s system.39 While from behind the veil, individuals
falsely making it appear that genetically high-risk workers and drug users are the
problem and without needlessly penalizing individuals perceived to be
susceptible. Investing in improved management policies and working conditions
could prevent disease more effectively than broad genetic screening. The
search for high-risk individuals should not limit the use of effective strategies
for reducing environmental hazards and disease that are already widely
recognized but underfunded.
Elaine Draper, The Screening of America: The Social and Legal Framework of Employers’
Use of Genetic Information, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 286, 313–14 (1999).
38. This is a basic postulate of Rawls, where he argued that differences in the
distribution of goods are tolerable so long as they work to the advantage of all, including
the least advantaged. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 13 (“[I]nequalities in wealth and
authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in
particular for the least advantaged members of society.”). The application of this
principle in the context of this Essay is that, so long as the savings from the reduced
requirements of workplace toxics control systems are adequate to compensate the
genetically susceptible, such a system is fair.
39. Richard Schmalbeck notes that Rawls implicitly assumed that there are
extremely risk-averse individuals who act only to maximize their own income because of
their concern for the possibility that they will be at the very, very bottom of the actual
distribution of social goods. Richard Schmalbeck, The Justice of Economics: An
Analysis of Wealth Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 512–13
(1983). “Rawls is at one extreme, implicitly assuming complete risk aversion.” Id. at
513 (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)).
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might conceivably wish to bargain for the right to be risk takers in the
postoriginal position real world, their actual inclination to do so must
take into account the impact of such freedoms on others, particularly
those whose lot will be made significantly worse by such a freedom,
such as minor children. What is at issue is the bargainers’ position on
the ex-ante possibilities of either being a genetically susceptible but nonrisk-averse individual (risk ostrich or risk-taking) or a surviving
dependent or loved one of such an individual. Bargaining for freedom
under such circumstances is bargaining for the acceptability of such
avoidable losses and the costs that they impose on others. Because for
every non-risk-averse individual that incurs an avoidable loss there is
likely to be more than one aggrieved loved one, I think the rational
bargainers would determine that their self-interest actually provides a
sufficient incentive to limit their future freedom to inflict avoidable
losses on others. Under Rawls’s difference principle, the infliction of
avoidable losses on those disadvantaged by the freedom to choose would
point us toward limiting the freedom to choose risk if reasonable
compensation for the loss of opportunity were provided.
Third, we could agree that employers would have the right to test
individuals to determine their sensitivity and exclude those that were
determined to be at greatest risk, so long as the employers had
contributed to a centrally administered compensation fund a percentage
of the savings from the more lenient exposure limits. Persons excluded
from a workplace by virtue of their genetic susceptibility would be
compensated by the centrally administered fund for their loss of
opportunity.40
40. The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice state:
[T]his reconciliation of equality with liberty and efficiency takes place through
the choice of principles that deliberators would make in the Original
Position . . . .
. . . In the general case, it may be better for deliberators, even for those
who anticipate they may turn out to be worse off with regard to marketable
talents and skills, to mitigate the effects of inequalities by redistributions of
other important goods than to insist on what may turn out to be a highly
inefficient “equalizing” of the distribution of natural talents and skills (or even
a more modest elimination of obviously disadvantaging traits). . . . The
Difference Principle, which allows inequalities only if they maximally benefit
the worst off, provides maximal mitigation of the consequences of the natural
lottery, at least in the general case. . . . Rawls assumes that deliberators in his
Original Position would make just such a reconciliation of competing
concerns, requiring that the system as a whole can be made to work to the
advantage even of those worst off . . . .
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Fourth, we could allow employers to test and exclude sensitive
individuals, but not require any payment by the employers or
compensation of the excluded persons.
It could be argued that the choice between the third and fourth options
should, in some cases, depend on the breadth of the disability that a particular
sensitivity poses.41 We might agree, from behind the veil, that persons who
are ultra sensitive to a substance that is found only in a relatively small
number of workplace environments have suffered such a small loss of
opportunity that it would not be worth the costs of administering a
compensation system to provide appropriate compensation for that minor
injury. In Part IV, I will argue that the need to contribute to a pay-to-exclude
compensation system is an important systemic safeguard against any abuse of
the right to discriminate and, therefore, must be assured in all cases.
On the other hand, we would all presumably agree that persons
abnormally sensitive to a substance commonly present in a great many
workplaces, at levels injurious only to the abnormally sensitive, may
suffer such substantial loss of life opportunities that compensation for
their losses, from the efficiency gains of the more fortunate, is required
by fairness and justifies the administrative expense of the compensation
scheme. Despite the fact that we are more likely to be among the
genetically normal compensators rather than the genetically sensitive
compensated, the difference principle clearly requires compensation
when the few sacrifice opportunity, albeit in part because of “brute
luck,”42 for the benefit of the many.
IV. THE OUTLINES OF A PAY-TO-EXCLUDE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
FOR WORKPLACE GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
I have argued, up to this point, that the bargainers behind the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance would agree to allow employers to test employment
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 128–29. Similarly, the difference principle is
satisfied if the greater prosperity afforded by avoiding both the costs of ultra low
workplace emissions standards and the costs of morbidity and mortality suffered by the
most susceptible is shared with the least advantaged, whose freedom of occupational
choice is constrained to achieve this surplus wealth.
41. But cf. Draper, supra note 37, at 313–14 (arguing that workplaces should be
made safe for the genetically sensitive rather than removing them from exposure to the
potential harm). Draper’s argument appears to be premised on the assumption that such
reductions in workplace risk could be made at reasonable cost. This Essay assumes that
by attaching a compensation cost to discrimination against the genetically sensitive,
rational employers would prefer to make changes in the workplace to reduce exposure
where doing so would be cost-effective.
42. For a discussion of this term in its philosophical context, see Jules Coleman &
Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill Lecture in Jurisprudence and
Public Policy), 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 120–22 (1995).
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applicants or employees for genetically determined hypersensitivity to
workplace toxins. I have also argued that it would be permissible to
exclude from the workplace those who are found to be at significant risk
of death or serious bodily harm at levels of exposure that would pose little
risk to the nonhypersensitive individuals. The right of an employer to test
and exclude is predicated on the excluded individuals’ compensation for
their lost employment opportunity, from a fund to which the employer
must contribute. The appropriate level of compensation and the
corollary level of employer contribution are essential to the fairness of
the system from a Rawlsian perspective.
While on strictly utilitarian grounds such compensation might not be
necessary, as the elimination of the unusually high risk of death would
provide a net benefit, Rawls quite clearly rejects the utilitarian analysis.
Instead, he argues that the bargainers in the original position would not
agree to allow arrangements in which the well-being of the least
advantaged would be simply sacrificed for the greater net good to others.
In order to satisfy the principles of equality and respect that are central
to A Theory of Justice, Rawls required that arrangements work to the
benefit of the least advantaged. Under the “maximin principle,” Rawls
required a choice of that alternative which provides the best result for the
least advantaged (maximizing the minimum), even if the total value of
all the possible outcomes under that alternative is less than that of other
alternatives.43
If Rawls made the question of whether to require payment an easy
one, he also provided a rough guide as to how to calculate compensation.
The starting point is the savings that are generated by not modifying the
workplace to accommodate the health risk posed to the most genetically
susceptible individuals. Rawls would require that the bulk of those
savings be devoted to the needs of the least-well-off, who in our case are
the excluded, hypersensitive individuals. This requires a reasonable
payment to an individual, even when the actual damages may be minimal
because the lost opportunity is of minimal impact on the individual’s
economic prospects.44 This requirement of a minimum payment might be
one year’s wages in the particular job sought, for instance.

43. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 133–37.
44. The economic impact would be minimal if the sensitivity is to a substance not
found in most workplace environments and where the individual can very likely find
other work at comparable pay.
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The minimum payment requirement serves at least several purposes.
First, it discourages employers from using genetic testing to exclude
individuals when the costs of reducing the exposure levels would be
relatively low. Second, it discourages reliance on tests of questionable
value. Third, it encourages employers to reduce exposure to relatively
rare toxins. If an employer’s workplace presents a rarely encountered
toxin (thereby generating the minimum lost opportunity and the
minimum compensation requirement) that would affect a more common
genotype (producing a relatively large number of persons who would be
excluded), then the costs of compensation even at the minimum quickly
mount to the point where the employer must either find an alternative
means of production or of toxic exposure control.
What if neither alternative is feasible? Let us assume that a particular
workplace contains a rare toxin, but one that may affect a relatively
common genotype (say twenty percent of the general population) by
giving rise to a substantial risk of a serious disease such as glioblastoma
(let us assume one percent, as in the case of our benzene and
glioblastoma example). If no means of eliminating the exposure can be
found, and the marketplace for the good and its substitutes cannot bear
the cost of providing one out of five job applicants with a full year’s
wage, then, under Rawls’s pay-to-exclude system, may the employer
provide the applicants with the choice to take the risk with the assurance
of full compensation for any resulting injury?45 The ex-ante argument
against allowing risk-prone individuals to take unreasonable risks, from
behind the veil, depended on the costs imposed on secondarily affected
persons.46 Would the bargainers behind the veil permit risk-taking under
this variant scenario where full compensation is assured? It is difficult
to argue that a compensation scheme for injuries incurred would cause
the original position bargainers to accept risk-taking behavior simply to
benefit marginally competitive enterprises, being those that cannot
impose a sufficient price increase to cover the costs of ex-ante
compensation. This is particularly true where, as here, the rarity of the
particular toxin is evidence that the affected persons will have other
adequate opportunities for gainful employment. Thus, the conclusion of
the pay-to-exclude system, with its minimum payment requirement, is
that a workplace that cannot bear the costs of the minimum ex-ante
45. Note that full compensation for actual injuries many years later, discounted by
the probability of actual injury, is only likely to be cheaper than paying (and excluding)
each of the at-risk workers one percent of a full ex-post award because of the time value
of money. Due to the time period between onset of exposure and disease, it is much
cheaper to face a twenty percent risk of a full award in thirty years than to pay twenty atrisk workers one percent of an award today.
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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payments, or workplace modifications that make payment superfluous,
would be forced out of business.47
The calculation of the maximum percentage to be contributed to the
central fund becomes somewhat more complex. A formula for such
calculations should primarily reflect the magnitude of the aggregate lost
opportunity to an affected individual as well as the savings engendered
by the exclusion. The magnitude of the aggregate lost opportunity to
any individual might be significantly affected by the extent to which that
person is excluded from a significant percentage of workplaces. An
unskilled laborer in south Texas might find that exclusion from working
in the petroleum exploration and processing industries reduces her
probable lifetime income by thirty to forty percent. If the average
industrial worker today is earning $35,000 per year and has a working
life expectancy of forty years, that loss of opportunity48 would be thirty
to forty percent of $1.4 million, discounted to present value and adjusted
upward for future inflation. The difficult question for the central
compensation fund’s administrators would be how to calculate the
impact on lifetime income that particular workers would suffer by
exclusion from a substantial percentage, for example, ten percent of
industrial workplaces. While we have set one year’s wages as a floor, it
may be that the wages for alternative employment choices for most
affected workers would result in no real lifetime income diminution.
This may mean that the minimum payment would be sufficient in almost
all cases.
Two other features of the centrally administered fund would also be
necessary. First, an affected worker would get one payment for any
particular genetic susceptibility. There would be no point in having an
47. Note that this result is only true where the substitutes for the particular product
are sufficiently competitive that the price cannot be raised to cover the minimum
payment requirements, that is, where the demand for the good is relatively elastic. If, for
example, the product in question were a terribly critical pharmaceutical, then the cost of
the product would in fact rise to include the social cost of the genetic discrimination
involved in its production.
48. The loss of opportunity for our purposes will virtually never be total because
there will always be occupations available in nonindustrial settings, albeit at a potentially
lower wage for unskilled workers. Total loss of opportunity, which would occur when
an individual is hypersensitive to a substance found at otherwise reasonably safe levels
in virtually all workplaces, should be a very rare occurrence because the sensitivity must
be to an essentially ubiquitous toxin, and the individual must not be suitable for
employment in nonindustrial settings that do not contain the toxin. If the toxin is in fact
found everywhere, then the problem is not one of workplace risk, and it is beyond the
scope of this Essay. See supra note 12.
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affected worker travel from one petroleum plant to another collecting
multiple payments for the same sensitivity.49 Second, the centralized
fund is then in the position of being able to make the sort of actuarial
adjustments to payments that an individual employer might find
difficult. These adjustments would reflect the centralized fund’s ability
to monitor the sorts of testing being done, the results of those tests, the
changing distribution of risks over time, and the percentage of workplaces
that contain and test for particular toxins.
The requirement that an employer pay a significant amount of the
savings that are produced when genetic testing and exclusion of the
most sensitive allows a safe workplace at lower cost serves an
additional important function—it provides a significant safeguard
against employers using ill-founded or suspect genetic tests. Because
the employer will be required to pay a significant amount into a
centralized compensation fund for each excluded worker, employers will
be loath to test unless they believe the tests are accurate and the savings
are substantial. A test that is over inclusive would be very costly and
much less attractive to employers. The substantial payment requirement
should result in employers making much more realistic decisions about
the cost of workplace toxins and the value of genetic testing, while
generating incentives for cheaper and more effective ways to eliminate
or reduce workplace toxin exposures.

49. John Mendeloff, Professor of Public Management and Policy at the University
of Pittsburgh, commented to the author in a discussion of this Essay that the
compensation system might be burdened by persons who are well qualified by education
and training for professional and managerial occupations, yet who decide to have
themselves tested to find out whether they could collect compensation by applying for an
industrial job for which they would otherwise never apply. This type of system gaming
may be impossible to avoid completely; however, employers are likely to adapt by
screening out from further consideration those who are overly qualified by education and
experience. The thrust of this analysis also extends to the broader social issue of
fairness. Numerous environmental justice commentators have raised the issue of
whether toxic risks are primarily born by the poor and persons of color. See generally
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993) (arguing vigorously that
environmentalists should be greatly concerned by the extent to which the effects of
pollution and toxic-generating activities have a disproportionate impact on the health and
welfare of the poor and persons of color). The proposal made in this Essay is not an
attempt to minimize the importance of the sort of environmental justice with which
Lazarus is concerned by suggesting that genetic susceptibility is a more important mark
of disadvantage (in the Rawlsian sense) than poverty or race. Rather, I assume that the
children of the upper middle class are significantly less likely to be applicants for jobs in
industrial settings that present toxic risks and thus will not be beneficiaries of the
compensation system proposed here. While remedying the distributional injustice of
current environmental and workplace safety laws is not the objective of this Essay, doing
so to a limited degree may be an ancillary benefit of the approach proposed here.
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V. CONCLUSION
The choice between a system in which employers can exclude
genetically hypersensitive individuals from exposures to workplace
toxins and a system in which individuals are allowed to make their
own decisions about risk and employment is a difficult choice if one
reaches beyond Rawls’s contractarian framework for competing
notions of fairness. I have previously asserted that a one percent risk of
glioblastoma is almost certainly a grave enough risk that rational persons
would choose to avoid it if it could be easily avoided. If that is true, then
predictive knowledge and adequate compensation makes risk avoidance
relatively easy and the only rational course. I suppose some might
criticize this conclusion as failing to value fairly individual autonomy,
that is to say that compensation for the loss of individual freedom and
autonomy is never adequate. Whether individuals should be allowed to
opt out and take such risks, waiving their right to a safe workplace, is a
serious and difficult question but one that I have also argued can be
answered in the negative by recourse to Rawls’s model of justice. The
application of Rawls’s justice as fairness principle leads to the
conclusion that employers should be allowed to use genetic tests to
identify and exclude persons who are unusually susceptible to the
potential hazards of their workplace environments so long as employers
are required to offer, through a centralized system, compensation to
those excluded. The sweeping theory of justice provided by John Rawls
provides a powerful tool for analyzing and resolving the problem of
genetic discrimination in the workplace.
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